The old adages of the business community of win-win deals and a quality product for a reasonable price were not part of the subprime loan deal. In order to understand how and why things were able to go so far out of control, it is beneficial to review some of the key points from the original lender and buyer.
Traditionally, an individual would find a home they wished to purchase, and seek out a lender directly or through a mortgage broker. Once a loan product was selected, the consumer became a homeowner and the lender would receive a promissory note with an established interest. The interest was the money the organization made for transacting the loan. Most loans are for thirty years. This was fair and equitable. The lender stood to make quite a bit of money over a long period.
Banks can only give so much money because of laws that require a ratio of capital on-deposit and money loaned out. Therefore, a small bank or a branch of a large bank only has a certain amount of money, yet they want to serve their entire community and members. Therefore, after so many loans the small banks would sell of the loan in a package to bigger banks. Some banks only deal with these kinds of large transactions (in the billions at a time). The small bank would keep the loan for a year or two and make a little revenue from the interest while also aging the loan to establish a payment history. The large banks would rate the small banks with a default factor and penalize or deny future business from these originating lenders. This helped ensure the buyer could afford the loan, that the lender would make a quality loan decision, and the large bank was buying a quality package. The homeowner still owns the house. The lender receives funds at a premium for operation and be able to provide additional loans the community. The large bank has a nice revenue stream from the interest and holds a large percentage of secured debt.
So What Happened?
Three things happened that caused the collapse.
- The introduction of the adjustable rate mortgage (ARM). This allowed homeowner to buy more house than they could typically afford. This was an initiative to compensate for wages not increasing at the same rate homes were appreciating, most ARM’s turn to a higher rate in the third or fifth year.
- Wall Street was able to detect money, and moved in with leveraging deals and mutual funds. Eventually, the large banks want to sell some of their holdings as their ratios adjusted and in order to keep buying more new packages. Mutual funds are more a long-term investment for their shareholders. They would buy these packages from the large banks and pass the interest in as revenue among the shareholders. Homes were appreciating at a phenomenal rate and were profitable for the mutual funds. If a home went into default, they could sell it for more money than the homeowner owes, then pass those proceeds back into the fund.
- Mutual funds wanted more, large banks wanted more, and smaller banks lowered lending standards to meet the demand.
Essentially, the mutual funds were handed a ticking time bomb because when the ARM’s started to kick in, people were unable to refinance their home because of debt to income ratios and were unable to pay the higher rates. As more default came in to the mutual funds, they stopped buying from the large banks, the large banks in turn stopped buy from the small banks and the small banks stopped loaning. The small banks were stuck with the lousy loans they wrote, and the large banks were stuck with all the packages they had bought. If a picture paints a thousand words, I suggest tornado. None of the players could say anything because it would cause mass hysteria and they were trying to sell off their packages to try to recover.
When evaluating the subprime loan scandal through the mediating lens of social responsibility, it becomes quite clear that the investment bankers, originating lenders, nor Wall Street had good intentions for the consumer. Social responsibility (SR) is honoring the duties owed to employees, stakeholders, and society in the pursuit of long-term wealth creation (Caldwell, Hayes, Karri, and Bernal, 2007).
The banks and lenders failed at their social responsibility because (a) they did not have society or the consumer’s best interests at heart when constructing their loan products and exit strategies. (b) Their actions were not for the creation of long-term wealth. Their actions were for short term, fast flip quarterly profits. (c) They failed at their legal obligation to create wealth for their shareholders.
Organizations have an obligation to self-regulate and perform at a higher standard than the law requires. If they do not the government will intervene through legislation and regulation. Most businesses agree that government intervention is not desirable. Murphy introduced the business community to the power-responsibility equilibrium. Murphy describes the equilibrium as when either power or responsibility is out of balance in the business community, forces (usually government regulation), will be forced to bring them into balance (1980). This is significant because according to Murphy if the businesses and the stakeholders do not accept responsibility for society, then the government will intervene.
The government did indeed respond with the signing of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act on July 21, 2010. Some highlights from the bill were the consolidation of some of the main regulatory agencies and the elimination of other agencies. The installation of a new oversight committee to increased transparency while enhancing the existing regulation of the financial markets. New consumer protection reforms, investor protection, and an overhaul of FDIC insurance protection (personal conversation, June 1 2013).
Caldwell, C., Hayes, L. A., Karri, R., & Bernal, P. (2007) Ethical Stewardship – Implication for Leadership and Trust. Journal of Business Ethics, 78, 153-164. doi: 10.1007/s10551-006-9320-1
Murphy, P. E. (2009). The relevance of responsibility to ethical business decisions. Journal of Business Ethics, 90, 245-252. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-010-0378-4